Drone threat picture · last reviewed · 17 incidents
Drone incidents in Denmark and Europe: since September 2025, drones and drone reports have closed airports in five countries.
Drone reports have halted traffic for hours at airports in Copenhagen, Aalborg, Oslo, Munich and Brussels, and four Polish airports, including Warsaw Chopin, closed temporarily when drones entered Polish airspace. Drones have been reported over air bases, ports and power plants; drones entering from Russian airspace have hit energy sites in Estonia and Latvia; and a drone carrying explosives was found at a German airport. Below: what happened, what it led to and what the authorities have confirmed — with sources for every entry.
How to read the labels
Drones confirmed by authorities
Authorities have confirmed that drones were present, for example by recovering one or tracking it on radar.
Drones observed by authorities
Police or the armed forces state that drones were seen, but no drone was recovered.
Closure confirmed · drones neither proven nor ruled out
A closure is confirmed; whether drones were present has been neither proven nor ruled out.
Reported — not confirmed
Reported by the company running the site, witnesses or the media, but not confirmed by authorities.
Explained — not a drone
Investigated and found not to be a drone. No entries yet.
No perpetrator identified
No authority has named who flew the drones.
Attribution as stated by …
We repeat an attribution only as an authority has stated it, and name that authority.
Jump to
Key figures
Drone incidents in numbers.
~4 h
Copenhagen Airport traffic halted after drone reports, 22–23 Sep 2025
Each incident carries two separate labels: what the authorities have confirmed about the drones, and whether an authority has named who was behind them. Summaries are in our own words; the sources are listed under each entry.
Airports
6 incidents
· Germany
Leipzig/Halle Airport, Saxony
Drones confirmed by authoritiesAttribution as stated by the German federal government
Drone with explosive device found at Leipzig/Halle Airport; flights halted overnight
On the night of 4–5 August 2026 an airport employee found a drone with an explosive device in the cargo area near the southern runway. Federal police removed the detonator. Flights stopped, and the northern runway reopened that night. Germany's government later attributed the attack to Russia.
Consequence: A cargo aircraft that aborted its landing collided with a presumed second unknown flying object and landed in Hanover with minor damage. Other flights were diverted. On 1 September Germany announced it would close Russia's consulate general in Bonn, among other measures.
Still unknown: Who carried out the operation on the ground. Russia's ambassador rejected the accusation as unsubstantiated.
Drone reports halt traffic at Brussels and Liège airports
On the evening of 4 November 2025 Belgian air traffic control halted flights at Brussels Airport twice, around 20:00 and 22:00, after drone reports. Liège Airport also closed. Belgium's defence minister later acknowledged that many drone reports from the period were false.
Consequence: Brussels Airport said 41 flights were cancelled and 24 diverted overnight, with more cancellations the next day; 400–500 passengers slept in the terminal. Charleroi paused traffic for about 20 minutes. The interior minister said Brussels and Liège halted traffic nine times in November and December.
Still unknown: Whether drones were present and, if so, who flew them. A VRT NWS fact-check found that many images shared as drones over Brussels Airport showed helicopters or cargo planes. The federal prosecutor had drawn no conclusions by April 2026.
Drones observed by authoritiesNo perpetrator identified
Munich Airport halts flights on two nights in a row after drone sightings
On 2 October 2025 drones were reported near the fence and then on the airport grounds. Flights were wound down from 22:18 and both runways stayed closed until early morning. The next evening police patrols reported two drones at once near the north and south runways, and traffic stopped again.
Consequence: First night: 17 flights cancelled and 15 diverted. Second night: 23 arrivals diverted, 12 cancelled and nearly 3,000 passengers stranded. On 4 October airlines cancelled about 170 of more than 1,000 planned take-offs and landings.
Still unknown: Who flew the drones and what type they were. The drones left before they could be identified, and no one has been named.
Aalborg Airport closed overnight after reports of several drones
At 21:44 on 24 September 2025, North Jutland Police received a report of several drones over Aalborg Airport, which shares its runway with Air Base Aalborg. The last sighting was logged at 00:54. In June 2026, police said drone activity could be neither demonstrated nor ruled out.
Consequence: Flights halted for several hours overnight; Reuters reported three diversions. The airspace was closed again briefly the next evening over a suspicion police could not verify.
Still unknown: Whether drones were present, and if so, who flew them.
Copenhagen Airport closed for about four hours after drone reports
On the evening of 22 September 2025, air navigation provider Naviair halted all take-offs and landings at Copenhagen Airport after reports of two to three drones nearby. Traffic resumed around 00:30. In June 2026, Copenhagen Police said it could neither demonstrate nor rule out drone activity.
Consequence: Take-offs and landings halted for about four hours. Early figures put it at around 100 cancelled flights and 31 diversions, with about 20,000 passengers affected.
Still unknown: Police say three objects seen in the air remain unidentified, and nobody has been held responsible.
Oslo Airport airspace closed for about three hours after possible drone sightings
Late on 22 September 2025, the evening Copenhagen Airport closed, police received reports of possible drones near Oslo Airport Gardermoen. The airspace was then closed until about 03:30. Police called the sightings possible but unverified and closed the case in November 2025.
Consequence: About 12 flights affected; inbound aircraft diverted. Avinor later confirmed that the airport's drone-detection system had been out of service for about 19 hours and that this contributed to the closure.
Still unknown: Whether drones were present. Police closed the case for lack of evidence after interviewing airport staff and reviewing camera footage.
Drones confirmed by authoritiesAttribution as stated by Ukraine's foreign minister
Drone hits oil storage site in Rēzekne after entering Latvia from Russia
On 7 May 2026 three drones entered Latvia from Russia and two came down. One hit an oil storage facility in Rēzekne, damaging four empty tanks. Latvia's armed forces said the origin was not yet confirmed but held Russia responsible, as its electronic warfare can divert Ukrainian drones.
Consequence: No injuries were reported, and a fire was quickly put out. Schools closed in two municipalities, and airspace below about 6 km in the eastern border region was restricted until about 18:00. Residents received phone alerts only after the crash. The defence minister resigned on 10 May.
Still unknown: On 10 May Ukraine's foreign minister said the drones were Ukrainian and had been diverted by Russian electronic warfare. Latvia's criminal investigation into their origin was continuing.
Drones confirmed by authoritiesNo perpetrator identified
Drone from Russian airspace hit a chimney at an Estonian power station
At 03:43 on 25 March 2026, a drone that entered Estonian airspace from Russia hit a chimney at the Auvere power station near the Russian border. Nobody was hurt. The government said several drones crossed the border that morning during a Ukrainian attack on the Russian port of Ust-Luga.
Consequence: Operator Enefit Power reported no immediate damage to the plant and no significant effect on the electricity system. The government held an emergency session, and a public alert went nationwide instead of to the affected region.
Still unknown: Whether the drone strayed off course or was guided. The Prosecutor General said it was not directed at Estonia; the investigation was ongoing in the sources we checked.
Drones reported over Doel nuclear power plant near Antwerp
On the evening of 9 November 2025 drones were reported over the Doel nuclear power plant near Antwerp. The operator, Engie, confirmed the sighting, said the drones flew over the site without permission and said plant operations were not affected. The national crisis centre said it was monitoring.
Consequence: Plant operations were not affected, according to the operator. The same evening Liège Airport halted traffic after separate drone reports.
Still unknown: How many drones there were (first reports said three, the operator later said five) and who flew them.
Drones reported over a naval shipyard, a power plant and other sites in Kiel
From the evening of 25 September 2025 drones were reported over a naval shipyard, a power plant, the university hospital and the Kiel Canal; a refinery in Heide was also named. The state interior minister told a parliamentary committee about reports of flying objects of various types and sizes.
Consequence: No damage was reported. Prosecutors opened an investigation, and the state government said suspected espionage and sabotage were being examined. Schleswig-Holstein said it was strengthening its drone defences together with the other northern German states.
Still unknown: Who flew the drones and why. The authorities have given no further details, citing the ongoing investigation.
Black Sea, near the Neptun Deep gas project, about 80 nautical miles east of Constanța
Drones confirmed by authoritiesNo perpetrator identified
Sea drone carrying explosives stopped near the Neptun Deep gas project in the Black Sea
On 20 August 2026 a commercial vessel reported a drifting sea drone in Romania's exclusive economic zone, near the Neptun Deep gas project. A Romanian F-16 hit it with cannon fire, and a naval bomb-disposal team then made it safe. Checks confirmed it carried explosives.
Consequence: The defence ministry set up a command cell and, in coordination with the president, decided to destroy the drone to protect several hundred people working on the platform. Days earlier a drone wing had been recovered in the same area.
Still unknown: No technical origin has been published. The defence minister said Ukraine had confirmed it was not Ukrainian.
Drones observed by authoritiesNo perpetrator identified
Police patrol saw several drones over Køge harbour at night
At about 22:30 on 3 January 2025, Mid and West Zealand Police received a report of several drones over Køge harbour and marina. A patrol saw what police believe were four; the last left over the sea at about 01:16. No permission had been given for drone flights there. PET was informed.
Consequence: No closures. Police opened an investigation and received further reports in the following days; they said some later sightings could have been aircraft on an adjusted approach to Copenhagen Airport.
Still unknown: Who flew the drones and why. Police treated espionage as one of several hypotheses and no stronger than the others. We have found no published conclusion.
Drones observed by authoritiesNo perpetrator identified
Drones over Kleine-Brogel air base on three nights in a row
Drones were reported over Kleine-Brogel, Belgium's F-16 base, from 31 October to 2 November 2025. A police helicopter and vehicles pursued one, and a jammer was tried, without success. The defence minister said it resembled a spy operation but could not say who was behind it.
Consequence: On 3 November the Chief of Defence ordered troops to bring down unidentified drones over military bases when this can be done safely. On 7 November the government approved about €50 million for detection and counter-drone equipment.
Still unknown: Who flew the drones. No drone or pilot has been recovered, and Belgian military intelligence treats only physical evidence as certain.
One or two drones reported inside and outside the fence at Air Base Karup
Around 20:00 on 26 September 2025, Central and West Jutland Police said one or possibly two drones had been seen inside and outside the perimeter of Air Base Karup. The next morning, the Danish Armed Forces said drones had been observed at several of its locations overnight, without naming them.
Consequence: Civil airspace over the base was closed for a period, with little practical effect because Karup has no civil air traffic.
Still unknown: In June 2026, police said drones over the district could be neither confirmed nor ruled out. The Armed Forces' evaluation describes two cases at unnamed air bases that day without saying whether either was Karup.
Drones observed by authoritiesNo perpetrator identified
Drones reported near Esbjerg and Sønderborg airports and Air Base Skrydstrup
On the night of 24–25 September 2025, police received reports of drones near Esbjerg and Sønderborg airports and Air Base Skrydstrup. The Danish Armed Forces said drones had been observed at several military installations, including Skrydstrup and the army barracks in Holstebro.
Consequence: None of the airports closed; police were present near the airports. The Armed Forces cited operational security and did not list every site.
Still unknown: In June 2026, South and South Jutland Police said it had found no evidence of unlawful drone flights of a security nature. The Armed Forces' June 2026 evaluation says drones were involved in several cases at military sites but does not link them to these locations.
Drones confirmed by authoritiesAttribution as stated by the Polish government and NATO
Drones entered Polish airspace during a Russian air attack on Ukraine
During a Russian air attack on Ukraine on the night of 9–10 September 2025, drones repeatedly entered Polish airspace; the prime minister reported 19 violations. Poland and NATO called them Russian drones; Russia denied targeting Poland. Prosecutors found no explosives in those recovered.
Consequence: Four airports, including Warsaw Chopin, closed temporarily. Debris fell in several places and a house was damaged; no one was hurt. Poland requested NATO Article 4 consultations, and NATO announced Eastern Sentry on 12 September.
Measures taken by authorities in response to drone incidents. They are dated and sourced, but they are not incidents: they carry no drone-status label and are not counted.
· Denmark
Denmark (nationwide); EU meetings in Copenhagen
Five-day nationwide ban on civilian drone flights during EU summit meetings
After a week of drone reports at airports and military sites, the Transport Ministry banned civilian drone flights over Danish territory from 29 September to 3 October 2025, around the EU meetings in Copenhagen on 1–2 October. State flights, including police and emergency services, were exempt.
Consequence: Breaches carried a fine or up to two years in prison. Allies sent help, including French and Swedish counter-drone units and German counter-drone equipment. Police called it the largest police security operation since COP15 in 2009.
Kept for comparison: an earlier case with the same pattern of uncertainty and disruption.
· United Kingdom
London Gatwick Airport
Drones observed by authoritiesNo perpetrator identified
Gatwick halts flights for about 30 hours over three days after drone sightings
Historical reference. From 19 to 21 December 2018 repeated drone sightings near the runway halted flights at London Gatwick for about 30 hours in total. Sussex Police later concluded, from 109 credible witnesses including a pilot and airport police, that at least two drones had been flown.
Consequence: About 1,000 flights were disrupted and more than 140,000 passengers affected. Military and private counter-drone equipment was brought in before the airport reopened. The police operation and investigation cost about £790,000.
Still unknown: Who flew the drones. Police closed the investigation in September 2019 without charges, after ruling out 96 people of interest, and found no evidence of state or group involvement.
Some entries mention jamming, bringing drones down or counter-drone units used by the forces and authorities involved. For the system VAERN assembles, these rules apply:
Capture, shoot down or jam — only after a human authorises it.
VAERN does not manufacture effectors. Partners supply them under their own authorisations and only where the law allows. A human authorises every engagement. At civilian sites, VAERN provides the air picture; authorities with a legal mandate carry out any intervention.
Threat types
Six drone threat types — and what each requires of protection.
01
Disruption through uncertainty
A reported drone near a runway can stop traffic for hours, whether or not a drone is later confirmed. Copenhagen Airport was halted for about four hours in September 2025; nine months later, police could neither show nor rule out that drones had been there.
What it requires: Fast, recorded verification from more than one sensor type, so a report can be confirmed or dismissed quickly.
Small drones, sometimes several at once, have been reported over air bases, a naval shipyard and power plants. In Kiel, flights over a naval shipyard led to an investigation on suspicion of espionage; in Belgium, the defence minister said drones over Kleine-Brogel air base resembled a spy operation.
Not every drone near a sensitive site is hostile: in 2024, Trafikstyrelsen registered 206 drone incidents relevant to aviation safety, such as drones flown too high or too close to airports. The hard cases are flights whose pilot cannot be identified or reached.
Small first-person-view (FPV) drones carrying an explosive charge are widely used in the war in Ukraine. Fibre-optic versions are steered through a thin cable and send no radio signal, so sensors that listen for radio cannot find them. Drones carrying explosives have also reached a European airport: in August 2026, one was found in the cargo area at Leipzig/Halle; the authorities have not published its type.
Long-range drones from the war in Ukraine have repeatedly crossed into NATO and EU states; some carried explosives, such as a drone that came down on a Lithuanian training area in 2025 and one that hit an apartment block in Galați, Romania, in 2026. Others were unarmed decoys: Polish prosecutors found no explosives in the drones recovered after the September 2025 incursion.
Coastal sites, ports and offshore energy can be approached from the water, where land-based sensors reach least. In January 2025, the last of the drones seen over Køge harbour left over the sea; in August 2026, a sea drone carrying explosives was stopped near Romania's Neptun Deep offshore gas project.
Danish police received more than 7,000 reports of possible drones from 22 September 2025; according to police, most very likely did not involve drones. In Belgium, 558 reports of suspicious drones came in between September 2025 and January 2026, and the defence minister later said many were false. A single report is hard to confirm or dismiss quickly, and the safe default is often to close.
Radar, passive RF and EO/IR each have blind spots that the others can cover: fibre-optic drones send no radio signal, and small, slow drones are hard to tell from birds on radar. Detection equipment can also be out of service; see the Oslo entry.
At a civilian site, the picture goes to the authority with the legal mandate; a defence user acts under its own mandate. In both cases, a human should authorise every engagement, with the decision on record.
04
Seconds count.
Sensors, datalink, console and response have to be planned as one chain before an incident — not connected during it.
The operator console shows the picture and the evidence behind it; a human authorises any response. Today it runs on simulated data.
04RespondForce or authority with the mandate
At civilian sites, VAERN provides the air picture and the authority with the legal mandate acts; defence users act under their own mandate, with effectors from authorised partners.
Capture, shoot down or jam — only after a human authorises it.
VAERN does not manufacture effectors. Partners supply them under their own authorisations and only where the law allows. A human authorises every engagement. At civilian sites, VAERN provides the air picture; authorities with a legal mandate carry out any intervention.
HAMMER is the operator console. The current demo uses simulated data and synthetic scenarios; the physical sensor and effector chain has not been validated.
Method
Method and corrections.
How we compile this page: official sources first, established media second; summaries in our own words. Each incident carries two separate labels — what the authorities have confirmed about the drones, and whether an authority has named who was behind them. We attribute incidents only as authorities have stated. Inclusion does not mean a drone was confirmed. VAERN was not involved in any incident listed and makes no claim about how any of them could have turned out differently. We review the page in batches; the date at the top shows the latest review. Corrections: info@vaernsystems.com.
Inclusion criteria
At least one official source, or two independent established media.
Relevant to protecting airports, critical infrastructure and military sites in low-altitude airspace.
No private persons are named.
Attribution only as an authority has stated it.
The war in Ukraine is context, not a war map. No maps or coverage analysis of Danish sites — site or city level only.
Changes and reviews
First published version: each entry checked against its sources; the EU summit drone ban is listed under authorities' measures and not counted. 17 incidents from 2018 to 2026.
Next step
Is your site or unit prepared?
VAERN's role: site survey, system design for your site or unit, and integration of partner hardware and the HAMMER console into one chain. Final configuration follows a site survey.
Status: the HAMMER console runs on simulated data today. The physical chain from sensor to response has not yet been built or validated.